Abstract. Secret-key authentication protocols have recently received a considerable amount of attention, and a long line of research has been devoted to devising efficient protocols with security based on the hardness of the learning-parity with noise (LPN) problem, with the goal of achieving low communication and round complexities, as well as highest possible security guarantees. In this paper, we construct 2-round authentication protocols that are secure against sequential man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacks with tight reductions to LPN, Field-LPN, or other problems. The best prior protocols had either loose reductions and required 3 rounds (Lyubashevsky and Masny, CRYPTO'13) or had a much larger key (Kiltz et al., EURO-CRYPT'11 and Dodis et al., EUROCRYPT'12). Our constructions follow from a new generic deterministic and round-preserving transformation enhancing actively-secure protocols of a special form to be sequentially MIM-secure while only adding a limited amount of key material and computation.
Introduction
This paper constructs efficient provably-secure protocols for secret-key authentication, i.e., for the basic cryptographic task where one party, called the prover, proves to another -the verifier -that they share the same key. Theoretical constructions of such protocols (with strong security, to be defined below) exist from any one-way function. Moreover, practical two-round protocols can be built from any message-authentication code (MAC) by having one party authenticate a random challenge, and can be instantiated efficiently for example assuming AES-128 is unpredictable.
In contrast, this paper contributes to a line of work [16, 18, 13, 19, 20, 10, 15, 22] on building provably-secure authentication protocols with security reductions to the learning parity with noise (LPN) and related problems that are as efficient as possible, meaning that key-size, communication, and rounds are minimized. LPN problem provides confidence in security due to the failure to find polynomial-time algorithms for it and its variants, despite wide interest [7, 21, 5] , and finding constructions of cryptographic primitives based on LPN has given rise to a substantial body of works [6, 14, 2, 17] .
The motivation behind LPN-based authentication protocols is their potential to be implemented with different efficiency characteristics from protocols with security reductions to blockcipher security or to problems from number theory and related fields. For instance, the parallel nature of LPN-based protocols seems difficult to achieve with factoring or discrete-log type assumption. The potential efficiency benefits of LPN-based implementations are a subject of ongoing research, which has identified some advantageous scenarios [15] but also invented faster attacks [21] . We thus focus on developing techniques for protocol design and theoretical analysis that beat previous asymptotic runtimes, key sizes, and round complexity of protocols with similar security reductions. We make no specific claims of more efficient protocols in specific deployment scenarios.
Concurrently to the above, the recent interest on secret-key authentication has also motivated attempts to develop a better understanding of its foundations, providing theoretical constructions based on concrete number-theoretic assumptions like the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, or general assumptions like weak pseudorandom functions [10, 22] . We will also contribute to these lines of work with new constructions.
But before we turn to describing our contributions in detail, we first give an overview of different security notions for secret-key authentication, as well as of previous works.
Security notions. Several security notions for secret-key authentication protocols have been considered, inspired by corresponding notions for the task of public-key authentication [12] . The weakest, passive security, says that an attacker should not be able to fool the verifier after observing several sessions between an honest prover and an honest verifier. This seems unreasonably weak for most settings, so the stronger man-in-the-middle (MIM) security notion says that no attacker should be able to cause the verifier to accept in any session where a message has been changed. Realizing that MIM security from LPN seems difficult to achieve efficiently, several works instead targeted an intermediate notion called active security which says that the attacker cannot fool the verifier after interacting with the prover arbitrarily and observing sessions passively.
The LPN Assumption (and its variants). Recall that for parameters ∈ N and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 2 , the (decisional) Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem LPN ,γ is the problem of distinguishing a polynomial number of samples of the form (r i , r T i s + e i ), for a common random secret s ∈ {0, 1} , random vector r i ∈ {0, 1} , and random bit e i (taking value one with probability γ), from samples of the form (r i , b i ), where b i is a random bit. The corresponding LPN ,γ assumption is that no efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) attacker can distinguish between the two distributions, except with negligible advantage. Ignoring the obvious differences in the error distributions, this is the modulo 2 variant of the learning with error problem introduced in [27] .
We are also going to consider a variant of the LPN problem, introduced and studied in [15] , called Field LPN. The Field-LPN ,γ problem is very similar, attack. One may consider looser reductions via so-called complexity leveraging where the reduction loses an exponential factor, with the view that one can enlarge the security parameter to compensate for the loss. Indeed one can prove (say) the AUTH 2 protocol from [20] as a fully-secure MAC with an exponential loss of security. A concrete instantiation of the result (assuming the BKW attack complexity is optimal [7] ) will be more efficient than the other approaches we have outlined.
Polynomial reductions, however, are preferred as they are more robust to algorithmic advances against the underlying problems. Achieving them is, in our view, an interesting theoretical challenge that requires new techniques. In an implementation it is not clear to the authors if either approach (leveraging or polynomial reductions) is necessarily more secure given the many factors one must consider.
Our contributions. We provide the to-date most efficient constructions of sMIM-secure authentication protocols based on the hardness of LPN, as well as on other assumptions. Our constructions are two rounds and the first message consists of a truly random challenge, and enjoy tight security reduction to the underlying assumption.
We improve upon the round complexity of existing sMIM-secure protocols without increasing key length and communication complexity, and without resorting to complexity leveraging. See Table 1 for a comparison of two of our new protocols to prior work. Note that our protocols are only a small constant factor less efficient than the best known actively (or even passively) secure protocols.
At the high level, our constructions follow from a generic transformation that upgrades a two round protocol of a special form to be sMIM-secure without introducing significant overhead. The required form is not especially contrived, but requires some care in its formalization and we present examples of such protocols to obtain our instantiations. We note that our reduction does not employ rewinding or forking lemmas like [22] , and is tighter and (arguably, to our taste) simpler as a result.
Our first construction achieves sMiM security with a tight reduction to LPN, two rounds of communication, and only a modest increase in either key size or communication over [22] . Our second construction, from Field LPN, matches the key size and communication of prior work in two rounds instead of three and has a tight reduction. In fact, for an appropriate choice of components, the second construction can be understood as a two-round version of the three-round protocol from [22] , though their proof does not cover the two round version.
We also provide a simple construction of a two-round sMIM secure authentication protocol based on the DDH assumption, where the prover response consists of two group elements. Interestingly, the same construction was proven MIM secure under the (less standard) Gap-CDH assumption in [10] .
Our last construction is based on an arbitrary weak PRF. The complexity of the construction is comparable to the one building a MAC from a weak PRF, using for example the constructions in [23, 24, 1] . However, our new protocols enjoy much better parallelism when compared to the naive approach, and is hence interesting on its own right. It is also fair to point out that [22] accomplishes in three rounds the harder task of finding a generic construction from a (randomized) weak PRF. We observe however that the only known concrete instantiations of weak PRFs are based on LPN/LWE-type assumptions as well as on DDH, and for all these concrete instantiations our constructions are more efficient.
We remark that it is not hard to see that our proofs do not show (full) MIM security, but we are not aware of an explicit MIM attack against the protocols.
Organization. Section 2 contains basic definitions used below. In Section 3 we describe our transformation from weaker protocols of a special form, and in Section 4 we give several instantiations of the transformation.
Protocol
Rounds Security Complexity Compl. trade-off Assumption Active ( * ) sMiM key size com. key size com. Table 1 : Authentication protocols based on LPN-related Assumptions. The security column lists the best possible security reduction from the given assumption, where q is the number of tag and verification queries. (The two MAC2 protocols are even secure in the full MiM model.) The complexity column lists the key sizes and communication complexity of the protocol (with lower-order terms dropped), where parameterizes the hardness of the assumption. All LPN-based protocols offer a trade-off between key size and communication, which is listed in the last two columns.
( * ) : Reductions to active security only considered one challenge session, and thus did not have the factor q. We state the bound for q challenge sessions for a fair comparison to MiM security. ( * * ) : We remark that the key size of the LPN-based protocol in [22] is 2 but one may be able to reduce it to O( ) by using an almost pairwise independent hash function.
Preliminaries
For a set X , x $ ← X denotes sampling x from X according to the uniform distribution. We use bold lowercase letters for vectors and bold uppercase letters for matrices, e.g., x ∈ F 2 , X ∈ F ×n 2 . For c ∈ F 2 , let M c denote the matrix of the linear map l c implementing the finite field multiplication with c when interpreted as an element in F 2 . Symmetric authentication syntax. We are going to consider secret-key authentication protocols, where a prover proves to a verifier that they hold the same secret key over two or more rounds.
More formally, an r-round symmetric authentication protocol with associated key space K is a triple of algorithms Auth = (Gen, P, V) with the following properties:
-Key Generation. The probabilistic key-generation algorithm K ← Gen(1 k ) takes as input a security parameter k ∈ N (in unary) and outputs a secret key K ∈ K.
-Interactive Execution. The probabilistic interactive algorithms P and V, which we refer to as the prover and the verifier, take both as input a secret key K ∈ K, synchronously interact with each other over r rounds, and finally V always receives the last message and outputs a decision out(P K , V K ) ∈ {accept, reject}.
We say that Auth has completeness error α if for all k ∈ N, Pr[out(
In this paper, we will focus on the simpler case of tworound protocols, where additionally the first message is a random challenge c ∈ C for some set C. We call such protocols two-round random-challenge secret-key authentication protocols. In particular, in such protocols the prover simplifies to a probabilistic algorithm P K , taking the challenge and the secret key K, and producing the message t to be sent back to the adversary. Moreover, for a challenge c ∈ C and response t from the prover, the verifier is fully specified by an algorithm V K (c, t) ∈ {accept, reject}.
Security. Several security notions for symmetric-key authentication protocols have been considered in the literature. The weakest one, passive security, says that an attacker should not be able to fool the verifier after observing several sessions between a honest prover and a honest verifier. The stronger notion called active security says that the attacker cannot fool the verifier after interacting with the prover arbitrarily and observing sessions passively. This paper targets the security notion of (sequential) security against manin-the-middle attacks (or s-mim security, for short). Here, the adversary acts as a man-in-the middle in a sequence of independent sessions between the prover and the verifier, all with the same secret key. The adversary wins whenever it manages to let the verifier accept in some session and has changed at least one of the messages sent by the prover or the verifier. We are going to formalize this notion for the relevant case of two-round protocols with random challenge.
Concretely, we describe this security notion via the following game S-MIM for an attacker A and a two-round random-challenge authentication protocol Auth = (Gen, P, V) with challenge set C.
Procedure V(t ):
In the game, the attacker makes calls to three oracles, C(·), P(·) and V(·). All oracles use a global variable sid to "synchronize" the sessions being simulated. The first oracle returns, for every session, a new random challenge. The oracle P(c ) runs the prover on input c and returns the response t. Oracle V(t ) checks that t is a valid response for the current session challenge c[sid] (obtained by calling C()), and increases the session number. Note that there is a unique value c[sid] defined in every session, and P only provides (at most) one valid challenge-tag pair (c , t) per session. The s-mim advantage is Adv Hash functions. Our constructions rely on almost pairwise-independent hash functions.
Definition 1 (Almost pairwise-independent hash functions). For
for all distinct x, x ∈ X and all y, y ∈ Y, and where
The requirement that a single input has uniformly distributed output is not common, but will be useful in applications and satisfied by the construction given below. Moreover, Definition 1 implies adaptive security, i.e., when given x, H K H (x) = y, for any x and y chosen adaptively depending on y, the probability that H K H (x ) = y is at most δ/|Y|.
Lemma 2.
If H is δ-almost pairwise-independent, then for every (unbounded) adversary A and every x ∈ X , we have
Proof. Assume wlog that A is deterministic, and let x (x, y) and y (x, y) be the values of x and y output by A on inputs y, x, where x (x, y) = x by assumption. Then,
A construction. We will make use of the following key-length efficient construction of a δ-almost-pairwise independent function, where
Lemma 3. The function H above is δ-almost pairwise independent for δ = −1.
The folklore proof is given for completeness.
, and analogously, define p x (a). Given two y, y ∈ F, we look at the number of keys (a, b) such that p x (a) + b = y and p x (a) + b = y . This in particular implies that a needs to satisfy
and since there exists i with x i = x i , note that by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma there are at most − 1 solutions a with the above property, since p x (a) − p x (a) is a polynomial of degree at most − 1. Each such a defines a unique b, and thus there are overall at most − 1 solutions, and each one of them is taken with probability |F| 2 . Finally, note that the distribution of H a,b (x) is, by itself, uniform, because the term b is uniform, and thus completely blinds the output.
Generic Construction
This section presents our main result, a generic construction of a two-round sequential MIM-secure authentication protocol Auth. Our construction relies on a simpler two-round symmetric authentication protocol Auth used as a component and which satisfies a particular form of security, in addition to having a structured tag space, as we discuss next. Later below, we will provide several instantiations of this generic construction in Section 4 via constructions of Auth based on a set of different assumptions.
Tools
Our construction is going to rely on an authentication protocol Auth = (Gen, P, V) whose responses given by the prover (which we call tags, following existing conventions in the literature) τ $ ← P K (c) are composed of two distinct components τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 ) ∈ T 1 ×T 2 . We refer to τ 1 and τ 2 as the left and right tag, respectively. In addition to this, we are going to require that the protocol satisfies two new properties which we now introduce and discuss.
Tag sparsity. The first property is a combinatorial property on the tag space of Auth. We are going to require that given any challenge c, any secret key K, and any left component of the tag τ 1 , there are only few right components τ 2 such that τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 ) is a valid tag for challenge c and key K. This is captured formally by the following definition.
Definition 4 (Right tag-sparsity).
For an = (k ), we say that Auth = (Gen, P, V) with tags in T 1 × T 2 , challenge space C, and key space K has -sparse right tags (or alternatively, Auth has -right tag sparsity) if
for all c ∈ C, K ∈ K, and τ 1 ∈ T 1 .
Note that one equivalent formulation is that for all K, c, and τ 1 , there are at most · |T 2 | valid τ 2 .
ROR-CMA security. We also consider a new property called real-or-random right-tag chosen-message security (or ror-cma security, for short), which is specific to protocols as above with tag space T 1 × T 2 . It considers a game where an attacker first receives a challenge c * , then can obtain prover tags for arbitrary challenges of its choice, and at the end can issue exactly one verification query for the challenge c * . The notion demands that the attacker cannot distinguish this game from another game where queries for challenges c = c * have the right tag τ 2 replaced by a random element from the same set. Formally, we introduce the following two games -denoted ROR-CMA(0), ROR-CMA(1) -involving Auth as well as an adversary A which outputs a decision value in {true, false} at the end of the game:
Procedure T(c):
Then, for an attacker A and a two-round protocol Auth, we define the ror-cma advantage as Accordingly, we say that Auth is (t, q, )-ror-cma-secure if for all t-time attackers A issuing at mostueries to oracle T(·), we have Adv ror-cma Auth (A) ≤ .
Relation to active security. We stress that ror-cma security and negligible right-tag sparsity, when achieved simultaneously, do not even imply passive security. Indeed, it is easy to modify any protocol with these two properties into one accepting tags of the form (τ 1 , 0) for every K and c (and hence becoming completely insecure) without invalidating these two properties. However, any such protocol can easily be enhanced to be secure against active adversaries by blinding τ 2 with a secret field element K, either via addition or multiplication.
(Note that negligible right-tag sparsity implies that the set of right tags has overwhelming size.)
Nonetheless, in order to better understand our construction below, it is important to observe why the resulting protocol is not necessarily s-mim secure. Consider e.g. the protocol such that P K (c) = (τ 1 , τ 2 = PRF K (τ 1 c)) for a random τ 1 and pseudorandom function PRF with key K and n-bit output, and for which V K accepts (τ 1 , τ 2 ) on input c if and only if PRF K (τ 1 c) has Hamming distance at most 1 from τ 2 . One can verify that this protocol is ror-cma secure and has negligible right-tag sparsity. But when the above tranformation is applied, resulting in tags (τ 1 , τ 2 = PRF K (τ 1 c) + K ), an attacker can easily derive a new valid tag for c as (τ 1 , τ 2 + ∆) for any weight-one ∆ -hence breaking s-mim security. (Similar counterexamples can be built when blinding via multiplication.)
The Generic Construction
We now turn to describing our generic construction transforming a ror-cmasecure two-round random challenge authentication protocol Auth with -right tag sparsity (for a small ) into a sequential MIM secure two-round authentication protocol.
Description. Let Auth = (Gen , P , V ) be two-round authentication protocol with associated key space K, challenge space C, and split tag space T = T 1 × T 2 , where we assume that T 2 = F is a finite field. 5 We will use + and • to denote addition and multiplication of field elements, respectively. Let H : K H × T 1 → F be a hash function. We build a 2-round symmetric authentication protocol Auth = (Gen, P, V) as follows. (The protocol Auth inherits the completeness error of Auth .)
, and generates a key K
-Challenge. The challenge is generated by the verifier V as c $ ← C.
-Response. The response σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) to challenge c ∈ C is computed by the prover P by first running τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 ) $ ← P K (c) and
-Verify. Given challenge c and response σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ), the verifier V reconstructs
and returns the decision {accept, reject} ← V K (c, τ ).
Overhead. We note that our transformation does not increase the tag size of the underlying protocol Auth , and thus retains its communication complexity. Moreover, the key length increases by adding K F and K H . Below, we will show that H can be instantiated with the hash-function construction given in Section 2, and thus these two additional keys consist overall of three field elements.
Security
The following theorem establishes the concrete security of our generic construction. In particular, it says that as long as for sufficiently small δ and , H is δ-almost pairwise independent and Auth has both -right-tag sparsity and is ror-cma-secure, then the construction is s-mim-secure.
Theorem 5 (Security of the generic construction).
Assume that H is δ-almost universal and that Auth satisfies -right tag sparsity and has completeness error α. Then, for all s-mim-attackers A invoking at most r sessions, there exists a ror-cma-attack B such that where B has running time approximately equal to that of A, and makes at most r queries to its oracle. In other words, if Auth is (t, r, )-ror-cma-secure, then Auth is (t , r, r · ( + r/|C| + δ|F|/(|F| − 1)))-s-mim-secure, where t ≈ t.
Proof. Let A be an attacker for game S-MIM which calls its oracles for at most r sessions. In the following, we are going to upper bound Adv
s-mim
Auth (A) = Pr S-MIM A Auth ⇒ true . The proof proceeds via a sequence of games. As our first step, we prove that it is sufficient to consider the first round where the attacker alters the communication between prover and verifier, and the latter still accepts. Formally, for all sid * ∈ {1, . . . , r}, let Win sid * be the event that in the experiment S-MIM 
Procedure V(σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 )): As our first step, we introduce r new games G 1 , . . . , G r , where G sid * only allows the adversary A to execute sid * sessions, and the verifier returns reject for the first sid * −1 sessions unless the adversary A has been simply forwarding honestly generated messages. A formal description of G sid * is given in Figure 1 . There, we implicitly assume that all oracles return ⊥ whenever sid > sid * . It is easy to see that by construction, Pr G A sid * ⇒ true ≥ Pr [ Win sid * ] − (sid * − 1)α. The offset depending on the completeness error α is due to the fact that G A sid * always accepts honest executions in sessions sid < sid * , whereas this is not necessarily true in S-MIM A Auth . Therefore,
In the remainder of this proof, for every sid * ∈ {1, . . . , r}, we are going to prove an upper bound on Pr G A sid * ⇒ true . In particular, we now fix an arbitrary sid * ∈ {1, . . . , r}, and let H 0 = G sid * . The proof now continues by transitioning from Game H 0 in turn to games H 1 , H 2 and H 3 . With respect to H 0 , these games will only differ in the way in which queries to P are answered, but all games will otherwise inherit the main procedure, as well as C and V, verbatim from G sid * = H 0 . A formal specification of the respective procedures is given in Figure 2 , and we now discuss them in detail.
We first transition to Game H 1 , where we will use ror-cma security of Auth to replace the right half of every tag computed by P to a random component whenever c = c[sid * ], i.e., different from the random challenge used in the last round. The proof of the following lemma is given below.
Lemma 6. There exists an attacker B such that

Pr H
where B has running time approximately equal to that of A, and makes at most r queries to its oracle.
Subsequently, in Game H 2 , whenever c = c[sid * ], instead of generating τ 2 at random, we directly generate σ 2 uniformly at random from the same set. Note that because K F = 0, we have that τ 2 · K F is a fresh random value, and thus the two games H 1 and H 2 are identical,
In the next game, Game H 3 , the procedure P replies to a query c = c[sid * ] only if it is made in session sid * , and otherwise returns ⊥. As c[sid * ] is chosen uniformly at random, and independent of the interaction between the adversary and the oracles in the first sid * − 1 sessions, the "fundamental lemma" of game playing [4] yields
Therefore, putting together Equation (1), Lemma 6, and Equation (2), we obtain that there exists an attacker B making at most r oracle queries and with time complexity close to the one of A such that In the rest of the proof, we give an upper bound on the probability that the game H 3 outputs true. The argument is going to rely on the almost pairwiseindependence of H and the right-tag sparsity of Auth , and is from now on a purely information-theoretic argument. In particular, it does not rely on K Auth being hidden, but only on the fact that all the right tags in sessions prior to sid * are random. 
Analysis of winning probability in
The crucial point is that K F and K H have never been used prior to the computation of τ 2 , as the oracle P has only returned random right tags. So we can equivalently think of generating these uniformly at random for the first time at this point independent of the rest of the game, and consider the probability that V K (c, (σ 1 , τ 2 )) verifies. Moreover, the value Y := H K H (σ 1 ) is going to be uniform (as we don't evaluate the function on any other point) by the δ-almost pairwise independence of H. Therefore, for every value t ∈ F,
However, by -right tag sparsity, we know that there are at most |F| possible values t for which (σ 1 , t) is a valid tag, and thus by the union bound
Case c = c, σ 1 = σ 1 = τ 1 and σ 2 = σ 2 . In this case, in session sid * , the attacker obtains (τ 1 , σ 2 ), where (τ 1 , τ 2 )
Once again, we evaluate H only with one input, and as above Y = H K H (τ 1 ) is uniformly distributed. Now, given σ 2 , τ 2 , and σ 2 , we want to upper bound the probability that τ 2 = t = τ 2 for some value t ∈ F, where the probability is over the choice of K F and Y .
Since τ 2 = t, there exists exactly one K F such that (τ 2 − t) · K F = σ 2 − σ 2 , and moreover, this defines a unique value for Y , which is taken with probability at most 1/|F|, and thus the probability in the numerator is upper bounded by 1/(|F|(|F| − 1)). Moreover, τ 2 • K F + Y is clearly uniform (because Y is uniform), and thus the denominator is 1/|F|. Putting these together gives us
. Now, due to -right tag sparsity, there are at most · |F| right tags τ 2 that verify, and thus
Case c = c and σ 1 = σ 1 . For the final case, the attacker obtains (τ 1 , σ 2 ) as in the previous case, but inputs (σ 1 = τ 1 , σ 2 ) to V, and the latter computes
F . Here, we indeed evaluate H K H on two inputs. However, by Lemma 2, we see that for every possible values σ 1 and y , chosen adaptively depending on τ 1 and H K H (τ 1 ), H K H (σ 1 ) = y with probability at most δ/|F|. Therefore, for every possible t such that V K (c, (σ 1 , t)) = accept, we have
Now, due to -right tag sparsity, there are at most · |F| such right tags, and thus
Putting things together. To conclude the proof, we observe that all terms in Equations (3), (4) and (5) Proof (Lemma 6). The attacker B for ROR-CMA(b) is very simple. It simulates the execution of H b to the attacker A. Initially, B uses its input challenge c * as c sid * . Then, when simulating queries to P on input c , it forwards them to its own oracle T, to obtain a pair (τ 1 , τ 2 ). Finally, B uses the one available verification query to compute V's decision bit in session sid * . Finally, B outputs the games H b 's output. By inspection, it is not hard to verify that Pr ROR-CMA(b) 
Instantiations
In this section, we will provide examples of ror-cma-secure authentication protocols. All of them can be transformed to s-mim-secure authentication protocols using the transformation from Section 3. Table 2 summarizes the resulting protocols compactly. Table 2 : New s-mim-secure 2-round authentication protocols.
Instantiations from LPN
Learning Parity with Noise. For a parameter 0 < γ ≤ 1/2, we define the Bernoulli distribution B γ that assigns e To define the LPN ,γ problem in dimension ∈ N and Bernoulli parameter 0 < γ ≤ 1/2 we introduce the LPN advantage as the quantity ROR-CMA secure Protocol. Let n = O( ) denote the number of repetitions, γ the parameter of the Bernoulli distribution, and γ := 1/4 + γ/2 controls the correctness error. The following authentication protocol Auth LPN = {Gen , P , V } originates from [20] . It has associated key space
, and challenge space C = F 2 .
-Key Generation. The key-generation algorithm Gen outputs a secret key
2 .
-Challenge. The challenge is generated by the verifier V as c The proof of the following theorem is postponed to Appendix A.2.
There exists an alternative ror-cma-secure authentication protocol [10, 20] which defines τ 2 = R T · k ↓c + e, where k ↓c is the projection of k with respect to all non-zero bits of c ∈ C := {F 2 2 : |c| = }. MiM secure Protocol. A s-mim-secure 2-round authentication protocol Auth LPN is obtained via the generic transformation from Section 3. An example instantiation using the almost pairwise independent hash function from Section 2 is given in Table 2 .
Trade-off. For all LPN-based protocols there exists a natural trade-off between key-size and communication complexity, as we will explain now. In the ror-cmasecure protocol AuthT LPN we can chose the key as (
2 and define the response to a challenge c ∈ F 2 as (r, (
where r $ ← F 2 . In the resulting s-mim-secure protocol we can use the specific pairwise independent hash function H S1,s2 (r) := S 1 r + s 2 , where (
The response to a challenge c is computed as σ = (r, z), where
This can be rewritten as z = (M c ·X 1 +X 2 )·r+e•x 3 +x 4 using the substitutions
The resulting protocol AuthT LPN is described in Table 2 .
Instantiations from Field-LPN
Field Learning Parity with Noise. To define the Field-LPN ,γ problem over the extension field (F 2 , •, +) and Bernoulli parameter 0 < γ ≤ 1/2, we introduce the Field-LPN advantage as the quantity ROR-CMA secure Protocol. Let γ the parameter of the Bernoulli distribution, and γ := 1/4 + γ/2 controls the correctness error. We use F = F 2 to denote the finite field. The following authentication protocol Auth Field-LPN = {Gen , P , V } originates from [15] . It has associated key space K = F 2 , split tag space T = T 1 × T 2 = F × F, and challenge space C = F.
-Challenge. The challenge is generated by the verifier V as c $ ← F. -Response. The response τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 ) to challenge c ∈ F is computed by the
-Verification. Given challenge c ∈ F and response τ = (r, z) ∈ F 2 , the verifier
As in the LPN case, Auth Field-LPN has 2 −O( ) completeness error and 2 −O( ) -sparse right tags. The proof of the following theorem is similar to that of Theorem 7 and is therefore omitted.
MiM secure Protocol. We now apply our generic transformation from Section 3 to Auth Field-LPN to obtain a s-mim-secure protocol. The key consists of (k 1 , k 2 , K F , s 1 , s 2 ), where we use the concrete pairwise-independent hash function H s1,s2 (r) = s 1 •r+s 2 . The response to a challenge c is computed as σ = (r, z),
This can be written as z = (r•(x 1 •c+x 2 )+e•x 3 +x 4 using the substitutions
The resulting simplified protocol Auth Field-LPN is given in Table 2 .
Instantiations from weak PRFs
Weak Pseudorandom Function. Let F be a function family F : K × D → F. To define the wprf F assumption over function family F we introduce the wprf advantage of an adversary A as the quantity
We say that F is a (t, q, )-weak PRF if for all attackers A with time complexity t, making at most q oracle queries, we have Adv wprf F (A) ≤ . ROR-CMA secure Protocol. We define an authentication protocols Auth wprf = {Gen , P , V } with associated key space K = K , split tag space T = T 1 × T 2 = D × F, and challenge space C = {0, 1} .
-Key Generation. The key-generation algorithm Gen outputs a secret key K = (x 1,0 , . . . , x ,0 , x 1,1 , . . . , x ,1 ) $ ← K 2× .
-Challenge. The challenge is generated by the verifier V as c $ ← {0, 1} . -Response. The response τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 ) to challenge c ∈ {0, 1} is computed by the prover P as τ = (r, z = i=1 F (x i,ci , r)), where r $ ← D.
-Verification. Given challenge c ∈ {0, 1} and response τ = (r, z) ∈ D × F, the verifier V outputs accept iff i=1 F (x i,ci , r) = z. The protocol has perfect completeness and 1/|F|-sparse right tags. It is easy to extend Auth wprf to randomized weak PRFs (with additive noise), as defined in [22] . This way we obtain protocols from a more general class of assumptions, such as Toeplitz-LPN [22] . The proof of the following theorem is in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 9. If F is a (t, q, )-weak PRF, then Auth wprf is (t , q, / )-ror-cmasecure with t ≈ t.
Instantiation from DDH
The DDH Problem. Let G be a family of groups with G n = (G, g, p) , where G is a cyclic group of prime-order p with log p = n and g generates G. To define the ddh G problem over group family G we introduce the ddh advantage as the quantity We say that ddh G is (t, q, )-hard if for all attackers A with time complexity t making at most q oracle queries, we have Adv ddh (A) ≤ . Note that classical ddh hardness is exactly (t , 1, )-hardness of ddh G and by the random self-reducibility of ddh we have that ddh G is (t, q, )-hard iff it is (t , 1, )-hard with t ≈ t and ≈ .
ROR-CMA secure Protocol. We define an authentication protocol Auth ddh = {Gen , P , V } with associated key space K = Z 2 p , split tag space T = T 1 × T 2 = G × G, and challenge space C = Z p .
p . -Challenge. The challenge is generated by the verifier V as c $ ← Z p .
-Response. The response τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 ) to challenge c ∈ F p is computed by the prover P as τ = (R, R y1·c+y2 ), where R $ ← G. -Verification. Given challenge c ∈ Z p and response τ = (R, Z) ∈ G 2 , the verifier V outputs accept iff R y1·c+y2 = Z. The protocol Auth ddh has perfect completeness and 1/p-sparse right tags.
Theorem 10. If ddh G is (t, q, )-hard, then Auth ddh is (t , q, )-ror-cma-secure with t ≈ t.
The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 7 and is omitted.
MiM secure Protocol. We now apply our generic transformation from Section 3 to Auth ddh to obtain a s-mim-secure protocol. By using the field structure of Z p in the exponent, we can use the concrete pairwise-independent hash function H s1,S2 (R) = R s1 · S 2 ∈ G, where (s 1 , S 2 ) ∈ Z p × G. The key of Auth ddh consists of (y 1 , y 2 , K F , s 1 , S 2 ). We now show that the key of Auth ddh can be shrinked by two elements, see Table 2 . The response to a challenge c is computed as σ = (R, Z), where Z = (R y1·c+y2 ) K F · R s1 S 2 = R y1K F ·c+y2K F +s1 S 2 . This can be written as Z = R x1c+x2 S 2 using the substitutions x 1 := y 1 K F , x 2 := y 2 K F + s 1 , X := S 3 . The resulting simplified protocol Auth ddh is given in Table 2 .
Note that in game G 0 all tags τ are computed correctly by T and hence G 0 = ROR-CMA(1). Furthermore, in game G , all tags except for challenge c * are uniform and hence G = ROR-CMA(0). The following lemma completes the proof of Theorem 9.
Lemma 11. For any j ∈ {0, . . . , − 1}, there exists an attacker B j such that To prove the lemma, we define an adversary B = B O() j (0 ≤ j ≤ − 1) against F, where O ∈ {F x , U}.
